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monopolize their party executive power - the crisis of inner-party democracy would

draft text for a section on the state of inner-party democracy in Germany. If you do additions, criticisms, or similar sources, they simply post in the comments. Thank you!

The pirates want to improve the inner-party democracy of their party with the introduction of Liquid Democracy. To understand this, the following will be a look into the forays of the old parties practiced internal party democracy.

Uwe Thaysen [1] has already done 1986th He criticized even then the "oligarchies" of the parties in the Federal Republic, that the increasing concentration of power in the federal executive boards and councils and the loss of power for the party based on the substantive direction of the party.



Thaysen cited First Robert Michels' iron law of oligarchy "(1911), under which the fall begins with every form of organization:" Who says organization, says tendency to oligarchy, "and" The power of the leader grows in the same scale as the organization, "and "The mother of the rule of the elected representatives of the voters, the officers on the client, the delegates about Deligierenden" the party organization. [2]

Thaysen was but warns against over-stretch to Michels. Of law could be no question. In 1986, members had the parties together around two million members and still not been transformed into leaders parties, . But rather an active party life But from that time were already drawing serious problems:

Thaysen were followed up in a list of all the facts to the party oligarchies, which I would like to play here sometimes quoting, sometimes in summary:

• social gap between membership (middle class) voters (bottom layer) and leadership (higher social and educational level) of the party
• centralization of all politically significant material and personnel decisions as possible to the higher level
• "Property Policy emptying of participation" (posters ) stick
• Voksparteien "Defuse" party programmatic and leave greater scope for development of handedness of the boards
• concentration of the programmatic planning in expert circles, commissions and advisory committees. District and local associations to participate therein, and usually do not remain on the sidelines. Accordingly, the key initiatives are not delegates, but from the highest party level.
• more or less discrete direction of the Congress prevents equal opportunity to talk. Party leadership has a "strong political predominance. Instruments directed the Commission's request, the editorial staffs and all costs silent operation of the Rules of Procedure.
• The dominant (self-) understanding of the parties as a fighting organization.. "Often, and relentless - but also often wrongly - to be made intra-party opponents to silence consensus should prevail then the party leaders have a generally accepted scope would need freedom, not previously of party meetings shake "canonical" statements. These statements are, however, fell only once, is it only at the cost of the allegation "lack of solidarity action." [3]
• The party heads have a sort of programmatic policy-making authority "increased and partly in their written statutes (eg SPD).
• Most its influence in the recruitment of top personnel. Only 100,000 delegates of the two million party members decide on all candidates and therefore two-thirds of the entire Bundestag. (Today, this is probably more dramatic, since often the candidates for party list seats, and boards are sophisticated in advance of party days).
• all in the dark of the party leadership will remain the decision of who the next chancellor candidate. There are in Germany (unlike, for example in the U.S. or the UK) no established written procedures. The party conventions is "presented" to the chancellor candidate of the Board. He then remains only the acclamation, approval by applause.
• Progressive shares professionalisation of political party members in knowing and unknowing, to-do and non-wealthy. The political professionals do not only live for politics. They also benefit from the policy. They are initiated. You know the machine, the game rules, the bylaws, the state of discussion of the planning bodies, and - more importantly - the state of discussion of personnel coterie. Their knowledge is their political dowry. And they have time to politics
• incompatibility
• habit claim the incumbent of reward / retention of his office
• also.: Apathy of the majority (of other interests, gratitude, leadership and devotion need)

The tendency towards domination of the few within the party recognizes Thaysen in the Political Parties Act, which - as the basic law - emanating from the "inevitability of dominance." The decisive point is the use and control of power. The intra-party control, notes Matthew, however, was developed within the party is much weaker than they have about the parliament against the government.

should be the inner-party democracy for Thaysen:

• strict adherence to the majority rule and minority protection
• decision-oriented participation of each party member

That, however, to realize even conceptually difficult as following the delegates and elected party leaders, the rules of representative democracy, not bound by imperative mandates of their voters, but on the contrary, as political leaders would prove. If the delegates are not necessarily guided by those whom they have delegated this stand the principle of "inner-party democracy" diametrically opposed. (Contradict Why representative democracy and direct democracy, I have explained in detail in this text )

This contradiction is even more clear when the inner-party democracy is lived. Within a short time unity is required. The Constitution defined the party task "Elaboration of political vision" (within the party) so koliert permanently to the second task of the parties - namely the "influence of government decision-making within the meaning of this objective" (external locus of action of the party) Yes. in general, is by the latter task of reaching a consensus within the party stalls.

proposes in his conclusion Thaysen but conciliatory tones. He pointed out that the Political Parties Act, the special role of the party executive wanted, and the Board are responsible in principle for his work would have. His main criticism he expressed at the apathetic majority that much too often himself would not accept any responsibility.

In his last point I want to speak again Thaysen. First, select the boards of its members, mostly from himself. Internal party known "opposition" will probably have little chance in this competition.

accuse the party members apathy I also think is questionable. For if the structures do not provide opportunities for substantive participation, and it is difficult aware, then the blame is simply the wrong one.

Too good to note is that the Board indeed had to justify to the party's base for his job (if this process works at all), a consolation the fact that the majority of the members bring in not more active in party work can.

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[1] Thaysen, Uwe: "Thinking without discussion to intra-party democracy in the Federal Republic ", in: Graf von Krockow, Christian and Clear, Peter. parties in the crisis, 1986 Munich, p. 59-71
[2] Michels, Robert:" The Sociology of the party system ", Stuttgart oJ , p. 381
[3] Thaysen has at this point to the fact that numerous studies have shown that intra-party consensus is overrated as a condition for success of the party. Finally, the Greens have had despite continuing intense intra-party disputes with great success.